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JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE: PLAYING POLITICS
WITH THE CONSTITUTION
Suzanna Sherryt
INTRODUCTION

I begin with a question: why have a conference on judicial
independence? To find the answer, one need only read the
newspapers. Judicial independence-as well as its political
counterpart, judicial impeachment-is a hot topic these days
because some in Congress have threatened to impeach judges for
delivering unpopular decisions. So I take as my subject in this
Essay the question of whether the constitutional provisions
safeguarding judicial independence protect judges against
impeachment for issuing rulings that Congress considers
erroneous or even loathsome.
When we talk about judicial independence, we have to
separate two questions. The first question is the extent to which
judges are or ought to be independent of the political branches of
government. May Congress impeach judges simply because it
disagrees with their rulings? Despite the current popular
inclination toward limiting this kind of judicial independence, I
think this first issue involves a constitutional rarity-an easy
question with a clear answer. Indeed, there is a fairly large body
of literature that reaches the same conclusion. I will therefore
begin my remarks with a relatively brief explanation of that clear
answer.
Regardless of whether judges ought to be independent of the
political branches, however, judges must still remain faithful to
"the law." In interpreting the Constitution, for example, judges
cannot claim to be independent of that document. Nevertheless,
there is a great deal of dispute about what it means to be faithful
to the Constitution.' This second question is in fact linked to the
first: much of the controversy about the extent to which the
political branches can or should control federal judges stems from

t Earl R. Larson Professor of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Law, University of
Minnesota.
1. For an extended discussion of this question, see Symposium: Fidelity in
Constitutional Theory, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1247 (1997).

795

HeinOnline -- 14 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 795 1997-1998

796

GEORGu STATE UNmVERSTY LAW Rimw

[Vol. 14:795

disagreement with the way in which those judges have
interpreted the Constitution.
Sometimes this latter debate is framed in terms of an attack
on (or a defense of) judicial activism. As Professor Friedman
suggests in his contribution to this Symposium, attacks on
judicial activism have a long history. The most recent version of
the debate has raged, basically unabated, for more than forty
years. I cannot imagine that after forty years I-or anyone else
for that matter-have anything very new to add, but that is
apparently what I was invited here to do. So I will give you a
brief summary of my views on appropriate methods of
constitutional interpretation. Again, however, I will only be
echoing what has been said before.
Now you might think that I would be content to discuss one
easy question and one hard question, both of which have been
extensively discussed in the legal literature, and leave it at that.
Unfortunately, as a law professor, I am constitutionally incapable
of taking the easy route. At the end of my remarks, therefore, I
will return to the linkage between the two questions, and suggest
that the answer to the easy question in fact points us toward an
answer to the harder one.
I.
We start with something of a conundrum. If we do not yet
know the appropriate method for interpreting the Constitution,
how can we determine whether the Constitution creates a
politically independent judiciary? To sidestep that problem, I will
examine the question using each of the three primary contenders
for the title of "best interpretive method." Those methods are
textualism, originalism, and pragmatism, and it turns out that
all three produce the same answer: federal judges are
constitutionally designed to be almost completely independent of
the political branches. While the meaning of the Constitution is
unclear with regard to a number of questions about judicial
independence-including, for example, whether impeachment is
limited to indictable offenses and whether the judiciary can
remove or otherwise discipline its own members 2-there is little

2. See, e.g., RAOuL BERGER, IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS 78-79
& n.131 (1973) (stating that impeachment is not limited to indictable offenses);
IRviNG BRANT, IMPEACmENT: TRTALS AND ERRORS 8 (1972) (stating that impeachment
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doubt that the Constitution severely limits the political branches'
control over the judiciary.
A.

Textualism

Textualism is a simple doctrine. A text, including the
Constitution, means what it says-no more, no less. The text of
Article III of the Constitution states:
The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall
hold their Offices during good Behavior, and shall, at stated
Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which
shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.3
Federal judges need not stand for reelection or reappointment,
no one can dock their pay in punishment for anything they do,
and they cannot be fired-the Constitution calls it
impeachment-as long as they remain on good behavior.
What does this text tell us? It tells us quite clearly that judges,
once appointed, are largely independent of the political branches.
The only ambiguity lies in the term "good behavior." One might
read that term to mean that a federal judge can be impeached
whenever the Congress dislikes or disagrees with something that
judge does; such an interpretation would, of course, significantly
diminish judicial independence. On the other hand, one might
read "good behavior" to limit impeachment to extreme cases of
judicial misconduct. Which of these two readings of the text one
adopts determines whether, under the Constitution, judges are
independent of the political branches.
Textualism is notorious for its inability to decide between two
plausible interpretations. As we will see when we turn to the
more difficult question of interpretive approach, the Constitution
is written in broad, vague, and sometimes archaic language. It
cannot be read like a shopping list. (My colleague Dan Farber
has written a charming essay showing that even a shopping list

is limited to indictable offenses); Peter M. Shane, Who May Discipline or Remove
Federal Judges? A Constitutional Analysis, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 209, 213-14 (1993)
(explaining that judiciary can remove its own members); Martha Andes Ziskind,

Judicial Tenure in the American Constitution: English and American Precedents, 1969
SUP. CT. REV. 135, 152-53 (explaining that judiciary cannot remove its own members).
See generally MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL IMPEACHMENT PROCESS: A
CONSTITUTIONAL AND HISTORICAL ANALYSIS (1996) (reviewing these and other
disputes).

3. U.S.

CONST. art.

M, § 1.
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cannot be read like a shopping list; it, too, must be interpreted.4 )
"Good behavior" is exactly such language-common in the late
Eighteenth Century and almost impenetrable in the late
Twentieth.
Nevertheless, in this case there are good (textualist) reasons to
prefer the interpretation which better protects judicial
independence. For one thing, such an interpretation is more
consistent with the surrounding text: why prohibit Congress from
diminishing judicial salaries and simultaneously permit Congress
to impeach at will?
It is also more consistent with other provisions of the
Constitution. The text of Article II indicates that all "civil
Officers" of the United States may be impeached only for5
"Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors."
Scholars have almost uniformly concluded that, because judges
are civil officers, judges cannot be removed except under the
provisions of Article I.6 Thus, judicial misbehavior cannot
include anything that does not fall into the category of "high
crimes and misdemeanors." While this still leaves two
questions-might "good behavior" create an even stricter
standard for impeachment, and are "high crimes and
misdemeanors" limited to indictable offenses?-I need not answer
either of them. Neither a good faith but erroneous interpretation
of the Constitution, nor an unpopular judicial philosophy, can
possibly be considered a high crime or misdemeanor.
In addition, Article I provides that all impeachments, including
the impeachments of judges, are to be "tried" in the Senate.'
While we cannot be sure what is meant by requiring that
impeachments be tried,8 it does connote a seriousness that
counsels against reading good behavior elastically. Finally, an
explanation for the use of the term "good behavior" may be found
by comparing it to the terms of office of elected officials. The

4. Daniel A. Farber, The Deconstructed Grocery List, 7 CONST. COMMENTARY 213
(1990).
5. U.S. CONST. art I, § 4.
6. See, e.g., Maria Simon, Bribery and Other Not So "Good Behavior": Criminal
Prosecution as a Supplement to Impeachment of Federal Judges, 94 COLUM. L. REV.
1617, 1621 n.14 (1994) (citing sources); GERHARDT, supra note 2, at 83-86; Shane,
supra note 2, at 241; Ziskind, supra note 2, at 151. But see BERGER, supra note 2, at
122-80.

7. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3.
8. See Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993).
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Constitution provides that the President, Vice President, and
members of Congress all serve for fixed terms.9 Good behavior
was an Eighteenth Century signal that the terms of office of
judges were not fixed, but permanent. Thus, we would be
misinterpreting the words if we took them to provide broad
congressional oversight of judges' "behavior."
Moreover, contemporaneous documents use the term "good
behavior"-or its opposite, "misbehavior"--in contexts that
strongly point toward very limited political control. The
Maryland Constitution of 1776, for example, grants judges and
other officials a right to hold office "during good behavior," and
makes them "removable only for misbehavior, on conviction in a
Court of law."'0 Here good behavior is equated with avoiding
criminal convictions, a standard very protective of judicial
independence.
The Massachusetts Constitution of 1780-which, incidentally,
although significantly amended, is still in effect-contrasts "good
behavior" with a more flexible length of tenure. It provides that
judges shall hold their offices during good behavior, but it notes
that "nevertheless" they may be removed by the governor acting
in concert with "the council" and "both houses of the
legislature."" The "nevertheless" is telling: the drafters of the
Massachusetts Constitution knew that by providing for
discretionary removal they were contradicting the usual meaning
of tenure for good behavior. It also confirms that good behavior
served primarily as a signal that the term of office was not fixed.
Both the language of the Massachusetts Constitution and the
contrast between it and Article III of the U.S. Constitution
suggest, again, that we should read good behavior in Article III
as limiting judicial impeachment to egregious wrongdoing.
Finally, we might interpret good behavior by looking at
potential alternative formulations. There are many much better
and clearer ways to provide Congress with discretion to remove
judges it does not like, including the language in the
Massachusetts Constitution. Indeed, language very much like
9. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3; id. art. II, § 1.
10. MD. CONsT. art. XL, reprinted in

3 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS,

COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAws 1696-97 (Francis Newton Thorpe ed.,
1909) [hereinafter FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS].

11. MASS. CONST. of 1780, ch. 3, art. I, reprinted in FEDERAL AND STATE
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 10, at 1905. The "council" is an advisory body to the
governor. See id. at ch. 2, art. I.
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that of the Massachusetts Constitution was proposed during the
Constitutional Convention, and was soundly defeated. If absolute
congressional discretion was considered too broad, different
mechanisms could have been adopted to limit congressional
discretion somewhat, including supermajority requirements,
recall provisions, and the like. We can find many examples of
similar devices in state constitutions or elsewhere in the federal
Constitution, but not in Article III. It therefore seems unlikely
that good behavior is a synonym for either limited or unlimited
discretion.
On the other hand, it is difficult to envision language-other
than the good behavior language actually used-that would
simultaneously protect judicial independence and yet allow for
the removal of seriously criminal or corrupt judges. Listing
offenses for which judges might be impeached is dangerous, for,
as James Iredell said in another context, "[1]et any one make
what collection or enumeration... he pleases, I will immediately
mention twenty or thirty more.., not contained in it."2
Corruption, as the founding generation well knew, is infinitely
ingenious, always taking new forms to evade old strictures.
Better not to make a list, lest it be thought exhaustive, allowing
some scoundrel to escape impeachment for a deed not on the list.
Thus, while there exist much better textual means to ensure
congressional discretion at various levels, there is no better way
than good behavior to create judicial independence while still
protecting against judicial corruption. From a textualist
perspective, then, it looks as if the Constitution deliberately
creates a federal judiciary that is as independent as possible of
the political branches. Impeachment is limited to serious judicial
misconduct.
B.

Originalism

Originalists recognize that ambiguities cannot always be
resolved by pure textual analysis and suggest that the
Constitution should mean what its framers intended it to mean.
There are, of course, serious questions about the identity of "the
12. 4 THE DEBATE IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION AS RECOMIENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT

PHILADELPHIA IN 1787, at 167 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed., J.B. Lippincott Co. 1941)
(1836) [hereinafter ELLIOT'S DEBATES] (remarks of James Iredell in the North
Carolina Ratifying Convention, July 29, 1788).

HeinOnline -- 14 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 800 1997-1998

1998]

PLAYING POLIICS WITH THE CONSTITUTION

Framers"-those who drafted the Constitution, those who ratified
it, or the population at large-but fortunately it makes little
difference to the current question. There is no doubt that the
entire founding generation interpreted the Constitution as
making federal judges independent of the political branches.
Indeed, one point of contention between those who supported the
Constitution and those who opposed it was whether an
independent federal judiciary was wise or necessary in a
republic.
Even for originalists, of course, the text itself provides good
evidence of the original meaning. Thus, the analysis in the
previous section should go a long way toward demonstrating that
an originalist approach yields an independent judiciary.
But beyond the text, there is also other evidence that the
founding generation thought the Constitution created a fully
independent judiciary that would not be subject to control by the
elected branches. Indeed, the evidence for this proposition is so
voluminous that I can only present a few examples here.
Let us begin with the Constitutional Convention itself. Late in
the Convention, John Dickinson of Delaware moved to amend
what became Article III by adding, after "'good behavior,'"
" 'provided that they may be removed by the Executive on the
application by the Senate and House of Representatives.' "'s In
the course of the brief debate over the proposed amendment,
Gouverneur Morris of Pennsylvania made explicit the reading of
good behavior that I suggested a few moments ago: he said that
he "thought it a contradiction in terms to say that the Judges
should hold their offices during good behavior, and yet be
removeable without a trial." 4 Confirming the idea that Article
III as written protects judges from political control, Edmund
Randolph of Virginia opposed Dickinson's motion "as weakening
too much the independence of the Judges." 5 The motion was
defeated by a vote of seven to one.
A separate discussion of Article III also indicates that the
delegates to the Convention meant to protect judicial
independence. The original draft of the judiciary article
prohibited Congress from either decreasing or increasing the

13.

JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at

536 (Ohio Univ. Press 1966).

14. Id. at 537.
15. Id.
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salaries of judges while in office. In mid-July, Gouverneur Morris
moved to eliminate the ban on increasing salaries. 6 The entire
debate over the motion turned on whether allowing Congress to
increase judicial salaries-which all delegates agreed might
become necessary due to currency fluctuations-endangered the
independence of the judiciary."' Although the delegates
ultimately voted in favor of Morris's motion, every delegate who
spoke denied that the judiciary should be in any way dependent
on the political branches. 8 The dispute turned on the factual
question of whether the proposed deletion did make them
dependent.
During the debates over ratification, both proponents and
opponents of the Constitution assumed that it protected judges
from the political branches. The most extensive discussion of the
tenure and removal of judges is found in Alexander Hamilton's
Federalist,Nos. 78 and 79. In these papers, Hamilton frequently
described judges as holding "permanent" tenure, and spoke of the
"permanency" of both their offices and their salaries. 9 Both
types of permanence, he said, are necessary to ensure the
independence of the judiciary. The only "precautions for [judicial]
responsibility," Hamilton continued, are to be found in "the
article respecting impeachments. " 2 And only "malconduct"
justified impeachment.
Other participants in the debates over ratification agreed.
James Wilson, in the Pennsylvania ratifying convention,
compared the proposed federal Constitution to that of
Pennsylvania. He suggested that in Pennsylvania, "the
independence of the judges is not properly secured,... [but that
tihis is not the case with regard to those appointed under the
general government; for the judges here shall hold their offices
during good behavior."2 Brutus, an Antifederalist writer,
objected to Article III on the ground that it made judges too
independent: "There is no authority that can remove them, and
they cannot be controuled by the laws of the legislature. In short,
they are independent of the people, of the legislature, and of

16. See id. at 317-18.
17. See id. at 317-18.
18. See id.
19. THE FEDERALIST Nos. 78, 79 (Alexander Hamilton).

20. Id. at No. 79.
21. 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 12, at 480.

HeinOnline -- 14 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 802 1997-1998

19981

PLAYING POLITICS WITH THE CONSTITUTION

803

every power under heaven."22 Although not technically part of
the ratification debate, James Wilson's 1791 lectures on law-a
seminal analysis by a delegate to the Philadelphia convention
who was also a major participant in the debates over the
Constitution-also defended judicial independence.
It is not surprising that the intent of the founding generation
seems so obvious and uniform. Eighteenth Century Americans
were reacting against the abuses of an English system that
viewed removal of judges as a wholly political matter. Although
the 1701 Act of Settlement gave British judges some
independence, the King frequently removed judges with whom he
was displeased, especially in the colonies.' Needless to say, this
led to a rather cowardly judiciary, and the founding generation
was determined to avoid the same result.
Even after 1789, there seemed to be little doubt that judges
were wholly independent of the legislature, and could not be
removed because of disagreements. The debate over the 1802
repeal of the 1801 Circuit Courts Act would have been a great
deal briefer had the participants thought that Article III allowed
easy congressional removal of federal judges. Instead, Congress
spent the better part of a month discussing whether the total
abolition of particular inferior courts-in this case, courts of
appeals-could constitutionally end the tenure of the judges who
sat in them. One comment in that debate is especially
enlightening. Senator John Ewing Colhoun of South Carolina
defined good behavior: it is, he said, "to act with justice, integrity,
ability and honor, and to administer justice speedily and
impartially...."25 There is not a hint in the debate that

22. Essays of Brutus, in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 438, § 2.9.189 (Herbert
J. Storing ed., 1981).
23. See James Wilson, Lectures on Law (1791), in 1 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON
296-97 (Robert G. McCloskey ed., 1967). In addition to his participation in the
drafting and ratification of the Constitution, of course, Wilson served on the United
States Supreme Court.
24. See generally PETER CHARLES HOFFER & N.E.H. HULL, IMPEACHMENT IN
AMERICA, 1635-1805 (1984); Ziskind, supra note 2, at 135.
25. See GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787
159-61 (1969); John D. Feerick, Impeaching Federal Judges: A Study of the
Constitutional Provisions, 39 FORDHAMi L. REV. 1, 10-12 (1970).
26. ANNALS OF CONGRESS, Jan. 19, 1802, at 140 (Dec. 7, 1801-Mar. 3, 1803) (Gales
& Seaton, eds. 1851). Colhoun was a Republican and, thus, would have been unhappy
with the new Federalist judges appointed under the 1801 Act. He was also John C.
Calhoun's cousin. See BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS
1774-1989, at 809 (1989)
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misbehavior includes good faith misinterpretations of the law.
(The Supreme Court ultimately upheld the 1802 statute, but
without considering the question of what to do with the judges
whose offices had been abolished.")
The first two judicial impeachment trials under the United
States Constitution add some admittedly ambiguous evidence.
Federal District Judge John Pickering of New Hampshire was
impeached in 1803 and convicted in 1804. Supreme Court
Associate Justice Samuel Chase was impeached in 1804 and
acquitted by the Senate in 1805.' Both were outspoken
Federalists who had angered the Republican Congress by their
behavior on and off the bench. Moreover, the official charges
against both men were fluid enough to encompass broad political
disagreement.
Chase was particularly despised. He had-in the view of most
Republicans-delayed justice in order to campaign for Federalist
John Adams. He had (and again, this is the Republican point of
view) malevolently issued erroneous legal rulings in order to
ensure convictions in cases involving two of the Federalist
statutes Republicans most despised: the Sedition Act of 1798 and
the federal property tax which sparked minor rebellions in
Pennsylvania. The enactment of these two statutes, in fact,
probably ultimately led to the Federalist defeat in 1800. Chase
had also frequently and intemperately castigated the
Republicans, their recently enacted judiciary bill, and their state
counterparts' move toward universal suffrage. In a charge to a
Baltimore grand jury, Chase had accused Republicans of moving
the nation toward a "mobocracy, the worst of all possible
governments," arguing that "the bulk of mankind are governed
by their passions and not by reason."29 Such sentiments were an
anathema to the Jeffersonian Republicans.

27. Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299 (1803).
28. The impeachments of Chase and Pickering are described and discussed in the
following sources, among others: JAMES HAw ET AL., STORMY PATRIOT: THE LIFE OF
SAMUEL
CHASE
209-41
(1980);
STEPHEN
B.
PRESSER,
THE
ORIGINAL
MISUNDERSTANDING: THE ENGLISH, THE AMERICANS AND THE DIALECTIC OF FEDERALIST

JURISPRUDENCE (1991); WILLAM H. REHNQUIST, GRAND INQUESTS: THE HISTORIC
IMPEACHMENTS OF JUSTICE SAMUEL CHASE AND PRESIDENT ANDREW JOHNSON 1-113,
127-28 (1992); Lynn W. Turner, The Impeachment of John Pickering, 54 AM. HIST.
REV. 485 (1949); HOFFER & HULL, supra note 24, at 206-20, 228-55.
29. STEPHEN B. PRESSER & JAMIL S. ZAINALDIN, LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE IN
AMERICAN HISTORY 224-27 (West 3d ed. 1995).
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Thus, some have argued that the impeachments of Chase and
Pickering were primarily political in nature, and that both men
were impeached for their views, not their misconduct.0 In this,
they echo John Quincy Adams, who wrote in his diary a week
after Chase's acquittal: "[Tihis was a party prosecution... [and]
a systematic attempt upon the independence and powers of the
Judicial Department."31
Nevertheless, there are some difficulties with such a
conclusion. Pickering, while a thorn in the Republicans' side, was
also undeniably mentally incompetent by the time he was
impeached. Even the most impartial and principled Senator
would have been justified in voting to remove him. Chase, who
was the more hated of the two, was ultimately acquitted by the
Republican-controlled Senate. Apparently, not enough
Republicans could bring themselves to convict on politics alone.
Every Republican Senator voted not guilty on at least one charge,
and six voted not guilty on all eight. A number of the six had
voted the previous year to convict Pickering: they must have seen
a difference between an insane judge and an independent one.
Early on, then, the Senate balked at using impeachment as a tool
to control judges who were merely errant, rather than criminal,
corrupt, or incompetent.
Finally, there is the evidence from over two hundred years of
American practice. Since the Constitution was ratified, only
twelve judges have been impeached by the House and only seven
of the twelve convicted by the Senate. All of those actually
convicted were impeached for serious misconduct, ranging from
habitual drunkenness and senility to conviction for criminal
offenses." While historical evidence does not conclusively
establish whether impeachment is limited to indictable
offenses-and the House has impeached for considerably less
serious misconduct-the Senate is much less likely to convict if
no indictable offense is charged.3 One scholar concludes that,
with one arguable exception, "no conviction.., has yet been
based solely on partisan grounds or at least along the lines of a

30. See, e.g., CHARLES WARREN, 1 THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY
282 (1922); HAW ET AL., supra note 28, at 240-41; see also BERGER, supra note 2, at
95-97.
31. JOHN QUINCY ADAhiS, MEMOIRS 370-71 (1874).
32. See GERHARDT, supra note 2, at 185 n.4.
33. See id. at 53.
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strictly partisan vote."' Moreover, other than Chase, who was
ultimately acquitted, no federal judge has ever been impeached
for his or her judicial philosophy or opinions. 5
While not strictly evidence of the intent of the Founders, two
hundred years of practice suggests that generations of Americans
have viewed impeachment as an extremely limited option. Had
impeachment for constitutional misinterpretation been thought
appropriate, John Marshall would have been impeached for
Marbury v. Madison,3 6 Roger Taney would have been impeached
for Dred Scott,37 and all Four Horsemen as well as both Earl
Warren and William 0. Douglas would have been impeached
several times over (albeit by different factions!). That the
numerous proposals to impeach these often unpopular Justices
never garnered sufficient support is further evidence that our
constitutional traditions do not contemplate judicial rulings or
philosophy as grounds for impeachment.
Thus, an originalist approach yields the same answer as a
textualist approach: judges are constitutionally independent of
the political branches, and may not be impeached merely for
objectionable decisions.
C. Pragmatism
Legal pragmatism is a more eclectic approach to constitutional
interpretation than textualism or originalism. Pragmatists
consult a broad array of considerations in order to interpret the
Constitution. A pragmatist finds no formula by which to decide
difficult constitutional questions, but instead internalizes legal
precedents, cultural traditions, moral values, and social
consequences, creatively synthesizing them into the new patterns
that best suit the question at hand. Pragmatist judging is an act
of controlled creativity. Like writing at its best, it both draws on

34. Id. at 54. The arguable exception is Judge Halsted Ritter, who was impeached
and convicted in 1936. Some scholars argue that the House fabricated impeachable
offenses to mask political disagreement with Judge Ritter's rulings. Others disagree.
Compare ELEANORE BUSHNELL, CRIMES, FoLLIEs, AND MISFORTUNES: THE FEDERAL

ILNPEACHIENT TIALS 286 (1992) (stating that Ritter may have been impeached for
political reasons), and Jacobus ten Broek, Partisan Politics and Federal Judgeship
Impeachment Since 1903, 23 MINN. L. REV. 185, 198-99 (1939) (discussing national
politics and Ritter's removal), with GERHARDT, supra note 2, at 54, 56.
35. See GERHARDT, supra note 2, at 164.
36. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
37. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
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and evokes memories of what has gone before, but by innovation
rather than by mimicry. It simultaneously acknowledges our debt
to the past and denies that the past should control the present.
The task of the pragmatist judge is to reconcile a flawed tradition
with an imperfect world so as to improve both and do damage to
neither. If this sounds impossible, you might compare it to the
best advice I have heard on raising children: be consistent and be
flexible. It sounds impossible, but parents do it every day. And
judges make pragmatist decisions every day.
Since both the text and the original intent of the Founders are
among the relevant considerations, the foregoing discussion
would help point a pragmatist in the direction of judicial
independence. Pragmatists would go further, however, and argue
that judicial independence is a necessary attribute of a
constitutional democracy. In a democracy, the majority rules, but
in a constitutional democracy, there are some things that even
the majority is not permitted to do. And an independent judiciary
is the only way to enforce those limits. As the Founders wisely
recognized, without an independent judiciary, there is no check
on majority tyranny. A judiciary controlled by the legislature
cannot serve to check the legislature's own excesses.
The best way to illustrate this argument-which I am certainly
not the first to make-is to compare the state and federal
judiciaries. State judges, unlike federal judges, are often subject
to electoral pressures. Does this compromise their ability to
administer justice or to enforce the less popular or more antidemocratic aspects of the Constitution? Professor Bright, among
others, has shown that in many cases the lack of independence of
state judges can result in either less protection of individual
rights, or, if the judge withstands the pressure, removal of the
judge by the electorate."8 We should not be surprised by such
findings. After all, as one scholar has pointed out, we generally
do not trust decisions made by those with an interest in the
outcome: "Imagine, for a moment, that the Chicago Cubs

38. See, e.g., Stephen B. Bright, Is Fairness Irrelevant?: The Evisceration of Federal
Habeas Corpus Review and Limits on the Ability of State Courts to Protect
Fundamental Rights, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1 (1997); Stephen B. Bright & Patrick
J. Keenan, Judges and the Politics of Death: Deciding Between the Bill of Rights and
the Next Election in Capital Cases, 75 B.U. L. REV. 759 (1995); Melinda Gann Hall,
Constituent Influence in State Supreme Courts: Conceptual Notes and a Case Study,
49 J. POL. 1117 (1987); Ronald J. Tabak, Capital Punishment: Is There Any Habeas
Left in This Corpus?, 27 LOY. U. CIE. L.J. 523 (1996).

HeinOnline -- 14 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 807 1997-1998

808

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 14:795

announced that from this point forward, they would hire
umpires, unilaterally determine their salaries, and retain
unreviewable discretion to fire them at any time. Can anyone
imagine that we could trust a call at second base?"39
A few examples should suffice to round out the pragmatist
argument in favor of judicial independence. First, of course, there
were the California votes recalling two supreme court justices for
their reluctance to uphold the imposition of the death penalty.
Second, citizens in other states have also waged successful
campaigns to oust judges who have upheld the rights of criminal
defendants. 0
Finally, a pair of Minnesota cases shows just how pervasive
the electoral influence can be. In 1991, the Minnesota state
legislature passed a law prohibiting employers from hiring
permanent replacements for striking workers. I have been
assured by my labor law colleagues that not a single labor law
expert in the country would have found this statute
constitutional, because it was
so clearly preempted by the
41
National Labor Relations Act.

You might ask why the Minnesota legislature would pass an
undeniably unconstitutional statute. It might help you to
understand if you know that there is no Democratic Party in
Minnesota: the party that opposes Republicans is called the DFL,
or Democratic-Farmer-Labor Party. Although Minnesota
Republicans recently changed their name from I-R, or
Independent-Republicans, the DFL has steadfastly adhered to its
unique name. At the time the statute banning striker
replacements was enacted, the DFL controlled the state
legislature, and strikebreaking was a big issue in Minnesota.
In any case, with the unconstitutional statute on the books,
two separate lawsuits were filed in Minnesota. Both plaintiffs
sought injunctions against the new anti-strikebreaker provision.
Within a few months of each other, both judges issued decisions.
Federal District Judge James Rosenbaum enjoined the provision

39. Martin H. Redish, Judicial Parity, Litigant Choice, and Democratic Theory: A
Comment on Federal Jurisdiction and Constitutional Rights, 36 UCLA L. REV. 329,
333 (1988).
40. See, e.g., Ronald J. Tabak, Politics and the Death Penalty: Can Rational
Discourse and Due Process Survive the Perceived PoliticalPressure? 21 FORDHAAM URB.
L.J. 239 (1994) (referring to Chief Justice Exun's Comments); Bright, supra note 36,
at 11.
41. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1994).
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as preempted.4 2 Minnesota state trial court judge Lawrence
Cohen upheld the Minnesota statute." Both judges' rulings were
affirmed by their respective courts of appeals." It took an
appeal to the Minnesota Supreme Court to finally reverse Judge
Cohen's clearly erroneous judgment.4 5 There is no rational
explanation for Judge Cohen's failure to see the obvious, but it is
likely that had he ruled against the striker replacement law, he
would have faced a serious challenge in the next election.
There are many other examples of state court judges who
lacked the courage or the will to defy popular sentiment, or who
did so and paid the price. I leave you to identify your own
favorites. Cases involving local athletes or well-connected
businessmen on the one hand, or criminals, minorities, or
political dissidents on the other, are a fruitful avenue of research.
Notice that my point here is not that federal court judges are
always right or state court judges always wrong. Indeed, after
twelve years of conservative Republican appointees to the federal
bench, I might be more inclined to agree with the substantive
views of state court judges than with those of federal court
judges. But whatever you might think of Justice Scalia's rulings,
for example, you cannot accuse him' of bending to popular
sentiment-nor can he be punished for his failure to do so. If his
interpretation of the Constitution is wrong, it is not because the
legislature is looking over his shoulder as he writes.
Thus, the pragmatist would wholeheartedly agree that judicial
independence of the popular branches is established by the
Constitution, and that judges cannot be impeached merely
because the legislature disagrees with their rulings.4"

42. See Employers Ass'n, Inc. v. United Steelworkers of Am., 803 F. Supp. 1558 (D.
Minn. 1992), aff'd, 32 F.3d 1297 (8th Cir. 1994).
43. See Midwest Motor Express, Inc. v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 139 LAB.
REL. REP. M. 2563 (Minn. D. Ct. 1992), aff'd, 494 N.W.2d 895 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993),
rev'd, 512 N.W.2d 881 (Minn. 1994).
44. See Employers Ass'n, Inc. v. United Steelworkers of Am., 32 F.3d 1297 (8th
Cir. 1994); Midwest Motor Express, Inc. v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 494
N.W.2d 895 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993).
45. See Midwest Motor Express, Inc. v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 512
N.W.2d 881 (Minn. 1994).
46. For other recent defenses of judicial independence, see, for example, Penny J.
White, It's a Wonderful Life, or Is It? America Without Judicial Independence, 27 U.
MEM. L. REv. 1 (1996); Victor Williams, Third Branch Independence and Integrity
Threatened by Political Branch Irresponsibility: Reviewing the Report of the National
Commission on Judicial Discipline and Removal, 5 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 851
(1995).
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II.
We turn, then, to the second question. Concluding that judges
are fully independent of the political branches does not set them
completely adrift. They are still anchored to the Constitution,
and their decisions must remain faithful to that document. Is the
required faithfulness limited to text and original intent?
The simple answer is that it would be impossible to interpret
the Constitution at all if we limited ourselves to textualism and
originalism. It is not that textualism and originalism provide bad
or incorrect answers; in most cases they cannot provide any
answers. Neither of those methods provides sufficient guidance to
resolve the sorts of constitutional disputes that arise today.
Let us begin with textualism. It is easy to use a textualist
analysis to determine that a thirty-year-old is ineligible to serve
as president. It is, as we have seen, somewhat more
difficult-but perhaps still possible-to use a textualist analysis
to determine that judges may not be impeached for their,judicial
philosophies. However, the fact that some participants in this
symposium apparently disagree with my textualist conclusion on
that question provides a perfect illustration of the difficulties
inherent in textualist analysis. And beyond these sorts of rather
clear textual provisions, textualism becomes completely
incoherent.
The framers simply spoke a different language than we do.
They were animated by different concerns, understood both law
and government in different ways, and used words to mean
different things. To us, good behavior is applied to prisoners
wanting an early release and children wanting a later bedtime.
To the framers it meant something else, but because we no
longer speak their language, it is difficult to know exactly what
they meant. And the difficulty in interpreting good behavior does
not even approach the problems we confront when we turn to
such phrases as "privileges or immunities," or "rights...
retained by the people," or "the equal protection of the laws."
To take a basic example, how are we to understand either the
Ninth Amendment's exhortation that "[t]he enumeration in the
Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or
disparage others retained by the people," or the Fourteenth
Amendment's ban on the abridgement of "the privileges or
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immunities of citizens of the United States"?47 The original
meaning of the fundamental terms in these clauses has become
incomprehensible because our view of law differs so greatly from
that of the founders. The founders believed in natural law and
natural rights: in the "brooding omnipresence" of law that we
modern, unremitting positivists finally laid to rest in 1938. 4
That belief underlay their use of both the "rights... retained by
the people," and the "privileges or immunities" of citizens. How
are we to interpret those phrases if we no longer share the
framers' worldview? It is, as John Ely once suggested, as if the
framers had incorporated in the Constitution some provision
respecting ghosts.4 9 We could not give any textualist meaning at
all to such a provision because we do not believe in ghosts.
This problem runs through almost all the provisions of the
Constitution that give rise to lawsuits. Indeed, the rare
provisions that are textually easy-such as the age limit for the
president-engender no disputes because they are easy.
Unfortunately, that fact does not help us when we have to
interpret the textually difficult clauses.
As an aside, I cannot resist noting here that even textualists
often cannot seem to remain faithful to their preferred approach.
Justice Scalia, for example, who claims to be a textualist, is
perfectly comfortable ignoring the plain meaning of even clear
constitutional text when it suits his purpose. What textualist
would think that language prohibiting the federal judiciary from
adjudicating suits "commenced or prosecuted against one of the
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or
Subjects of any Foreign State"" would also prohibit a suit
against a state brought by one of its own citizens? Justice Scalia
and at least four of his brethren reach just such a counter-textual
interpretation. 5

47. U.S. CONST. amends. IX, XIV, § 1.
48. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); see also Southern Pac. Co.
v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("The common law is not
a brooding omnipresence in the sky but the articulate voice of some sovereign or
quasi-sovereign that can be identified . .
").
49. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REviEw 39 (1980).
50. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
51. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 29 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996). For the
textualist-originalist argument against this bizarre interpretation, see Seminole Tribe,
116 S. Ct. at 1145-85 (Souter, J., dissenting) and sources cited therein.
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It should not surprise us that a document written in the
Eighteenth Century-or even in the middle of the Nineteenth-is
textually inscrutable at the end of the Twentieth. What is
surprising is the number of people who continue to insist that
textualism is not only a valid interpretive method, but is the only
valid interpretive method.
As for originalism, divining the original intent of the founders
is no easier than ascertaining the meaning of their text, and for
many of the same reasons. Whatever evidence we have of the
original intent is itself written in often archaic language and
based on the same incomprehensible worldview that makes the
text so difficult to understand. Moreover, even identifying
relevant evidence poses difficulties, ranging from disputes about
who should count as a framer to doubts about the integrity of the
historical record. And why should we assume that "the framers"
had a monolithic opinion on the Constitution they adopted?
Maybe they disagreed with one another. Finally, even once we
pass over these initial hurdles, the historical evidence is still
hopelessly ambiguous.
After thorough and careful historical research, respected
scholars disagree with one another on the original meaning of
almost every important constitutional provision. Does the
Eleventh Amendment apply to all suits against any state, only to
suits by non-citizens of the state, or only to diversity suits? There
are scholars who support each of the three positions.52 Does the
Fourteenth Amendment incorporate any or all of the Bill of
Rights, so that the provisions of the Bill of Rights limit states as
well as the federal government? The same historical evidence has
led different scholars to different conclusions. 3 Did those who

52. See, e.g., William P. Marshall, The Diversity Theory of the Eleventh Amendment:
A Critical Evaluation, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1372 (1989); Lawrence C. Marshall,
Fighting the Words of the Eleventh Amendment, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1342 (1989),
Calvin R. Massey, State Sovereignty and the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments, 56 U.
CHI. L. REV. 61 (1989); William A. Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of the
Eleventh Amendment: A Narrow Construction of an Affirmative Grant of Jurisdiction
Rather than a ProhibitionAgainst Jurisdiction,35 STAN. L. REV. 1033 (1983), William
A. Fletcher, Explanation of the Eleventh Amendment: A Reply to Critics, 56 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1261 (1989); Vicki C. Jackson, The Supreme Court, the Eleventh Amendment,
and State Sovereign Immunity, 98 YALE L.J. 1 (1988).
53. Compare MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDmENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS 92-105 (1986), with Charles Fairman, Does the
Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights? The Original Understanding, 2
STAN. L. REV. 5, 134 (1949).
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adopted the Establishment Clause mean to bar any government
aid to religion, or only government preference for particular
religions? Scholars disagree.5 4 Did those who adopted the Equal
Protection Clause mean to prohibit segregated public schools?
Again, scholars disagree.5
Originalism, like textuaism, is simply not a viable interpretive
method. It does not matter whether we ought to defer to the
views of long-dead aristocrats from a society that excluded large
portions of the population from voting. The hard truth is that we
cannot defer to their views, because we cannot identify those
views with any confidence. The text and the original intent are
starting points for constitutional interpretation, but they cannot
be a stopping point.
III.
There is one final issue raised by my exploration of these two
questions of judicial independence, and one final linkage between
the two. I began by saying that judges have an obligation to
remain faithful to the Constitution. Might those who wish to
impeach a judge for wrongheaded decisions argue that such
decisions constitute faithlessness, and can thus serve as grounds
for impeachment? Judges, they might suggest, are independent
only to the extent that they remain faithful to the Constitution,
and judges who pick the wrong interpretive method-or even
simply reach the wrong result-are unfaithful and therefore
impeachable. In other words, the second question trumps the
first.
But for anyone who counts faithfulness to the Constitution as
an important value, that argument gets things exactly
backwards. It is the answer to the first question that helps us
determine the answer to the second. The Constitution tells us, in
no uncertain terms, that political control over the judiciary shall

54. Compare ROBERT L.

CORD, SEPARATION

OF CHURCH AND STATE: HISTORICAL

FACT AND CURRENT FICTION (1982), and Robert L. Cord & Howard Ball, The
Separation of Church and State: A Debate, 1987 UTAH L. REV. 895, with Douglas
Laycock, "Wonpreferential"Aid to Religion: A False Claim About Original Intent, 27
WAT. & MARY L. REV. 875 (1986).
55. Compare Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions,
81 VA. L. REV. 947, 950-53 (1995), with Alexander M. Bickel, The Original
Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1955), and Michael
J. Kiarman, Brown, Originalism, and Constitutional Theory: A Response to Professor
McConnell, 81 VA. L. REV. 1881 (1995).
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be extremely limited. Before we conclude that impeachment is
warranted in any given case, we ought to measure it against that
constitutional background. In order to be faithful to the
Constitution, we must ask ourselves whether such an
impeachment would undermine the Constitution's clear directive
that judges should be independent.
In other words, is it consistent with judicial independence to
impeach judges for adopting the wrong approach to interpreting
the Constitution? That depends on how wrong the approach is,
and how certain we are that reasonable people could not
disagree. Impeaching judges for their judicial philosophy puts
ultimate control over the important question of appropriate
methods of constitutional interpretation in the hands of
Congress. It significantly diminishes a judge's ability to act, in
good faith, in the manner that Colhoun described as good
behavior: "to act with justice, integrity, ability and honor, and to
administer justice speedily and impartially. . . ."' As long as
reasonable people disagree on whether a judge's philosophy or
interpretive approach is valid, impeaching him for that
philosophy is inconsistent with the clear meaning of the
Constitution.
Let me turn the tables for a moment. I have just argued that
neither textualism nor originalism is a valid interpretive method.
The only correct method of interpretation is pragmatism. Does
that mean that Justice Scalia should be impeached for his
consistent rejection of the pragmatist approach? Of course not.
The Constitution's guarantee of judicial independence entitles
him to the benefit of the doubt-the same benefit of the doubt
that should be given to judges who adopt pragmatism or any
other plausible interpretive approach. When a judge starts
deciding cases by tossing a coin, only then might it be time to
bring out the impeachment machinery.
CONCLUSION

A proposal to subject federal judges to greater political control
was raised during the Constitutional Convention, and again
immediately after Justice Chase's acquittal by the Senate. Both
were stillborn. Cooler heads prevailed, as they have numerous
times over the past two hundred years, whenever a perceived
56. ANNALS OF CONGRESS, supra note 26, at 140.
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crisis has led to attacks on the independence of the judiciary.
There are once again calls to rein in independent judges, and it is
ironic that those who purport to be most solicitous of history and
most guided by its lessons are the ones now seeking to break
with the past. Let us not be the first generation of Americans to
succumb to what James Madison called the "transient
impressions" of popular sentiment,57 lest we lose one of the
necessary supports of liberty and democratic government.

57. MADISON, supra note 13, at 193.
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